During the course of an investigation into one campaign, we noticed the threat actors had taken some additional precautions to avoid disruption or takedowns. As such, we decided to have a deeper look into the bulletproof techniques and services offered by their hosting company.
What we found is an ideal breeding ground where criminals can operate with total impunity from law enforcement or actions from the security community.
Using servers hosted in battle-scarred Luhansk (also known as Lugansk), Ukraine, Magecart operators are able to operate outside the long arm of the law to conduct their web-skimming business, collecting a slew of information in addition to credit card details before it is all sent to “exfiltration gates.” Those web servers are set up to receive the stolen data so that the cards can be processed and eventually resold in underground forums.
We will take you through analysis of the skimmer, exfiltration gate, and hosting servers to show how this Magecart group operates, and which measures we are taking to protect our customers.
The skimmer is injected into compromised Magento sites and trying to pass itself for Google Analytics (google-anaiytic[.]com), a domain previously associated with the VisionDirect data breach.
Each hacked online store has its own skimmer located in a specific directory named after the site’s domain name. We also discovered a tar.gz archive perhaps left behind by mistake containing the usernames and passwords needed to login into hundreds of Magento sites. These are the same sites that have been injected with this skimmer.
Looking for additional OSINT, we were able to find a PHP backdoor that we believe is being used on those hacked sites. It includes several additional shell scripts and perhaps skimmers as well (snif1.txt):
In the next step of our analysis, we will be looking at the exfiltration gate used to send the stolen data back to the criminals. This is an essential part that defines every skimmer and can help us better understand their backend infrastructure.
A closer look at the skimmer code reveals the exfiltration gate (google.ssl.lnfo[.]cc), which is another Google lookalike.
The stolen data is Base64 encoded and sent to the exfiltration server via a GET request that looks like this:
The crooks will receive the data as a JSON file where each field contains the victim’s personal information in clear text:
The primary target here is the credit card information that can be immediately monetized. However, as seen above, skimmers can also collect much more data, which unlike requesting a new credit card, is much more problematic to deal with. Indeed, names, addresses, phone numbers, and emails are extremely valuable data points for the purposes of identity theft or spear phishing attacks.
Panel and bulletproof hosting
A closer look at the exfiltration gate reveals the login panel for this skimmer kit. It’s worth noting that both google.ssl.lnfo[.]cc and lnfo[.]cc redirect to the same login page.
lnfo[.]cc is utilizing name services provided by 1984 Hosting, an Iceland-based hosting provider that “will always go the extra mile to protect our customers’ civil rights, including the freedom of expression, the freedom of the press, the right to anonymity and privacy.” It’s quite likely the threat actors may be taking advantage of it.
The corresponding hosting server (176.119.1[.]92) is located in Luhansk (also known as Lugansk), Ukraine.
A little bit of research on this city shows it is the capital of the unrecognized Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), which declared its independence from Ukraine following the 2014 revolution ignited by the conflict between pro-European and pro-Russian supporters. It is part of a region also known as Donbass that has been the theater for an intense and ongoing war that has cost thousands of lives.
Amid this chaos, opportunists are offering up bulletproof hosting services for “grey projects” safe from the reach of European and American law enforcement. This is the case of bproof[.]host at 176.119.1[.]89, which advertises bulletproof IT services with VPS and dedicated servers in a private data center.
A host ripe with malware, skimmers, phishing domains
Choosing the ASN AS58271 “FOP Gubina Lubov Petrivna” located in Luhansk is no coincidence for the Magecart group behind this skimmer. In fact, on the same ASN at 176.119.1[.]70 is also another skimmer (xn--google-analytcs-xpb[.]com) using an internationalized domain name (IDN) that ties back to that same exfiltration gate.
In addition, that ASN is a hotspot for IDN-based phishing, in particular around cryptocurrency assets:
Bulletproof hosting services have long been a staple of cybercrime. For instance, the infamous Russian Business Network (RBN) ran a variety of malicious activities for a number of years.
Due to the very nature of such hosts, takedown operations are difficult. It’s not simply a case of a provider turning a blind eye on shady operations, but rather it is the core of their business model.
To protect our users against these threats, we are blocking all the domains and IP addresses we can find associated with skimmers and malware in general. We are also reporting the compromised Magento stores to their respective registrars/hosts.
Indicators of Compromise
Skimmers (hosts)google-anaiytic[.]com (176.119.1[.]72)xn--google-analytcs-xpb[.]com (176.119.1[.]70)
Skimmers (exfiltration gate/panel)google.ssl.lnfo[.]cc (176.119.1[.]92)
The post No man’s land: How a Magecart group is running a web skimming operation from a war zone appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.
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